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“Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and 
Important 
Ruth V. Aguilera and Cynthia A. Williams 
“On the face of it, shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world. 
Shareholder value is a result, not a strategy. . . . Your main 
constituents are your employees, your customers and your products.”1  
– Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While virtually all scholars of corporate governance agree that 
national differences exist in corporate governance practices and their 
efficacy, debate continues regarding the relevant dimensions of 
difference and how to best explain them. In this Essay, we argue that 
the strong conceptual and empirical link between law and finance as 
proposed within the legal origins theory and fully launched in a series 
of articles by LLSV2 is inaccurate, incomplete, and yet important. At 
the least, it is important to get a clearer view of the field such that we 
may better understand the broader scope of the “law-finance” 
relationship, particularly as the law and finance theory has had 
demonstrated effects on international policy developments. 
A number of scholars have effectively demonstrated the key 
shortcomings of this theoretical and empirical unidirectional linkage 
from law to finance.3 We do not need to review that literature here, 
 
  Associate Professor and Fellow at the Center for Professional Responsibility in 
Business and Society, College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
  Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 1. Francesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009. 
 2. We use the acronym “LLSV” to refer to the four authors of the first legal origins 
papers, which include Rafael La Porta, Francisco Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A 
Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 3. See generally Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002); 
Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”), 33 DEL. J. 
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but we find it convincing. And, in response to some of their critics, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have rectified some of their 
strong and prescriptive former claims.4 In this Essay, we discuss in 
Part II what we have learned from this agitated debate with so many 
policy and real life ramifications, why it is important to conceptualize 
a larger and more complex picture of the proposed law-finance 
causality, what we can learn from existing research on comparative 
systems in social science, and what we need to study next in the field 
of research of legal systems and economic sociology. In Part III, we 
discuss why it is important to get “law and finance” right. 
II. THE VIEW FROM ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY:                                           
LAW AS A PARTIAL VIEW 
A. Complementarities Matter 
One could take multiple routes to illustrate the principle that 
looking simply at the characteristics of the legal system to explain 
economic outcomes is incomplete. One limitation is, perhaps, the 
methodological tools we use to analyze these questions. For 
instance, it seems rather narrow to summarize the advanced 
industrialized countries into two stylized systems: liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies, which happen to 
correspond nicely to the common and civil law dichotomy. Perhaps 
the explanation for simplicity is the methodological limitations we 
face in comparative corporate governance research and comparative 
law—namely, a large number of potential explanatory variables and a 
small number of cases. Kogut and Ragin put it well when discussing 
the limited diversity within varieties of capitalism and their empirical 
rejection of the hypothesis of a direct relationship between rule of 
law and financial development. They state that “[c]ontrary to silver 
bullet theories, many studies recognize that economic systems are 
varied and that there is more than one path to wealth.”5 
 
CORP. L. 111 (2008); Mathias M. Siems, Simon Deakin & Priya Lele, The Evolution of Labour 
Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 133 (2007). 
 4. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008). 
 5. Bruce Kogut & Charles Ragin, Exploring Complexity When Diversity is Limited: 
Institutional Complementarity in Theories of Rule of Law and National Systems Revisited, 3 
EUR. MGMT. REV. 44, 50 (2006). 
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Organizations are widely conceived as complex systems of 
interdependent factors, but empirical methodology often poorly 
reflects such interdependence. For example, standard linear models, 
such as regression analysis, treat variables as competing to explain 
variation in the outcome rather than focusing on how causes may 
combine in specific cases to create outcomes. Meanwhile, case studies 
have an important tradition in organizational research, but such 
studies face the challenge of generalizing across cases or using cases 
effectively to better “contextualize” the boundary conditions of 
existing theories. Recently, new innovations in comparative research 
methods have been developed and applied to the comparative study 
of corporate governance at the organizational or national level. In 
particular, a number of newer small-n and set-theoretic methods, 
such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (“QCA”), have been 
applied to cross-national data (where n is small)6 or to organizational 
analysis where causation is complex and there is more than one path 
to an outcome.7  
Jackson and Aguilera have used this comparative methodology to 
study why the twenty-two OECD8 countries used in their study 
show such diverse ownership structures and how these ownership 
structures have shifted over time—from the 1990s to the 2000s.9 
They were able to systematically explore various existing explanatory 
factors in conjunction (law, financial systems, labor markets, political 
system, board composition, etc.).10 They demonstrate, for example, 
that law is necessary but not sufficient to explain economic 
organization.11 More specifically, their analysis rejects the sweeping 
conclusions drawn from most of LLSV’s studies.12 They show that 
quality of law proves necessary for ownership dispersion, at least at a 
 
 6. See generally id. 
 7. See generally CHARLES C. RAGIN, REDESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: FUZZY SETS AND 
BEYOND (2008). 
 8. OECD stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The 
OECD is an organization of thirty countries committed to democracy and the market 
economy. See About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103 
_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 9. Gregory Jackson & Ruth V. Aguilera, Some Determinants of Diversity on Cross-
National Corporate Ownership: A Fuzzy Sets Approach (2009) (working paper, on file with 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry).  
 10. Id. at 4–5. 
 11. Id. at 2, 5. 
 12. Id. at 20. 
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minimum threshold, but that the reverse case (concentrated 
ownership as a reflection of poor quality of law) is not necessarily 
true.13 That is, Jackson and Aguilera show that not all cases of 
concentration are the result of bad law. 
The need to study driving factors in conjunction to obtain a 
more comprehensive yet systematic understanding of relationships is 
also true for the political hypothesis based on Gourevitch and 
Shinn14 and Roe.15 The political factors influencing ownership 
structure, as discussed by Roe and Gourevitch, appear to be 
important, but they are missing interesting nuances if not explored in 
combination with other explanatory factors, such as the structure of 
labor forces, law, finance, etc. That is to say that strong-law and 
weak majoritarian institutions are sufficient but not necessary for 
dispersion. The main point from this research is equifinality, 
suggesting that there are multiple paths to any given outcome. For 
instance, if strong law is not present then there might be substitutes 
(strong labor and left-wing politics) to strong law that in 
complementarity lead to the same outcome that strong law would 
lead. It also suggests that there is not one best Pareto optimal 
solution in institutional settings or a one-model-fits-all best practice 
of corporate governance.  
B. The Difficulty of Transplantation and the Reality of Translation 
It is particularly illuminating to explore nonpure models, such as 
examining what happens when archetypical “Anglo-Saxon” 
shareholder-value-oriented practices are implemented in non-Anglo-
Saxon institutional environments. Examining the transplantation of 
such corporate governance practices allows us to get a deeper 
understanding of how countries, industries, and firms are selective in 
their adoption of “pure” corporate governance practices and even 
more often how some effort is invested into translating those 
practices so they fit into their environment. A good illustration of the 
diffusion of practices is the globalization of Anglo-American 
institutional investors in the mid-1990s, which shocked the recipient 
host countries’ established norms and practices but did not manage 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005). 
 15. Roe, supra note 3.  
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to fundamentally transform them. We will draw on two empirical 
examples to be more specific.  
First, Goyer’s research comparing foreign investment in France 
and Germany demonstrates that law and ownership structures cannot 
account for the disparities in the investment allocation by short-term 
investors in those two countries.16 He looks at the different patterns 
of investment by short-term institutional investors in France and 
Germany and finds that for stakes above the five percent level, short-
term investors are twice as likely to invest in France as compared to 
Germany.17 Why? Because Germany’s work councils and organized 
labor make it more difficult to set in motion short-term oriented 
strategies to extract shareholder value, while labor is less powerful in 
France.18  
Second, the translations that occur with transplantation are not 
only ideological but also structural, as illustrated in the research by 
Ahmadjian and Robbins.19 They show that the foreign (mostly U.S.) 
ownership of Japanese firms grew from five percent in 1990 to 
twenty percent in 2001; these foreign investments led to a clash of 
capitalism between foreign share owners and local owners (mostly 
banks and other local firms).20 Foreign owners were interested in 
establishing shareholder-oriented (short-term) practices such as 
downsizing and asset divestitures.21 Ahmadjian and Robbins are able 
to show that the presence of foreign capital determined the levels of 
downsizing and divestitures in this period in Japan—practices highly 
inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder capitalism and challenging 
traditional lifetime employment.22 When Japanese owners maintained 
control, however, these shareholder-friendly practices still occurred, 
but at a much slower rate.23 
 
 16. Michel Goyer, Capital Mobility, Varieties of Institutional Investors, and the 
Transforming Stability of Corporate Governance in France and Germany, in BEYOND 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: CONFLICT, CONTRADICTIONS, AND COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 195 (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes & Mark Thatcher eds., 2007). 
 17. Id. at 205. 
 18. Id. at 206–15.  
 19. See generally Christina L. Ahmadjian & Gregory E. Robbins, A Clash of Capitalisms: 
Foreign Shareholders and Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 451 
(2005); see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 14; Roe, supra note 3.  
 20. Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 19, at 452. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
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C. The Relationship of Law and Politics 
Roe argues that legal institutions are a direct derivative of politics 
because countries have different preferences concerning the 
legitimacy of shareholder value.24 If shareholder value is considered 
legitimate, institutions are then built to protect minority 
shareholders.25 By contrast, the absence of institutional arrangements 
that would protect the rights and promote the interests of minority 
shareholders in some countries reflects the lack of legitimacy about 
caring only for shareholders. Thus, the question is not about the 
technical issue of building an efficient system of corporate law, but 
about the issue of whether political will exists to do so.  
Roe further argues that it is simplistic to think that legal 
institutions which were introduced seven hundred years ago, such as 
the civil law code-based jurisprudence, are as important in 
influencing economic life as regulations that were introduced fifty 
years ago, such as the 1933 U.S. Glass-Steagall Act or the 1936 
Italian Banking Law introduced in reaction to the 1930s financial 
crisis and the Second World War.26 We find these arguments 
persuasive.  
D. Ownership Structures—Dispersed Is Not Necessarily Optimal 
The implicit assumption of the legal origins theory is that 
dispersed ownership within corporations is the ownership structure 
most likely to produce the best economic outcomes. Yet, most firms 
in the world are not owned by dispersed shareholders but are firms 
with controlling shareholders, mainly family-owned firms or firms 
owned by either large institutional investors or the state.27 Even in 
the United States—the archetypical Anglo-Saxon shareholder-
oriented country with dispersed ownership—between 1992 and 
 
 24. Roe, supra note 3, at 267.  
 25. Id. at 262–63. 
 26. Mark J. Roe, Juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 
294, 295–308 (2007). 
 27. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and 
Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2742–44 (2000); Mara Faccio & 
Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 
(2002); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, 
and France, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 30, 32–37 (1997); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 287; 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 
461, 462–65 (1986). 
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1999, one-third of the largest firms (the Standard & Poor 500 
Industrial (“S&P 500”)), which accounted for eighteen percent of 
the S&P 500 equity stake, had family ownership control structures.28  
The legal origins research and some finance scholars argue 
(sometimes quite forcefully) that continued family ownership 
generally leads to poor performance; hence, they recommend that a 
more efficient ownership structure aligning management with 
shareholders’ interests is dispersed ownership with strong minority 
shareholders protection.29 However, the jury is still out within the 
corporate finance literature on whether family-owned firms perform 
worse—or better—than firms with nonfamily ownership. For 
example, Anderson and Reeb state, “[C]ontrary to the notion that 
family ownership is detrimental, we find stronger firm performance 
in family than in nonfamily firms.”30 Villalonga and Amit report 
similar results.31 As argued by agency scholars, concentrated 
ownership can be advantageous to minimize managerial 
expropriation because it combines ownership and control.32 Of 
course, as uncovered by Faccio et al., in the case of East Asian 
markets or the Adelphia U.S. case, this monitoring will only work 
when there are transparent financial markets and nonfraudulent 
accounting, respectively.33  
Another dimension of corporate ownership to be understood is 
not so much the type of owner but how much they own (i.e., 
concentration). We do not equate the owner’s identity with the 
firm’s responsibility as one did fifty years ago with the Fords, the 
DuPonts, and the Rockefellers of Chandler’s multidivisional firms, 
probably because firms have become so large and because there is a 
mix of ownership (as in the United States). It is also arguable that 
U.S. corporate governance has shifted from “managerial capitalism” 
with dispersed retail ownership where managers made the key 
 
 28. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1302 (2003). 
 29. See generally RANDALL MORCK, CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (2000). 
 30. Anderson & Reeb, supra note 28, at 1303. 
 31. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and 
Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385 (2006).  
 32. Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes 
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985). 
 33. Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, Dividends and Expropriation, 91 
AM. ECON. REV. 54, 72 (2001). 
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decisions, to “investor capitalism.”34 As Davis argues in his book, 
Managed by Markets: How Finance Reshaped America, the arrival of 
postindustrial society, predicted by Daniel Bell, in which the great 
majority of jobs are in the service sector, accompanied by a weaker 
relationship between employers and employees and a shift in pension 
financing from defined benefit company pensions to “defined 
contribution plans” (401(k)), has triggered the massive growth of 
the mutual fund industry.35 Mutual funds and other institutional 
investors are growing in size and ownership concentration. Davis 
states, “Nearly three quarters of the average Fortune 1000 
corporation’s shares were owned by institutional investors in 2005, 
with mutual funds making up the most concentrated block.”36 Yet, 
these portfolio shareholders show a remarkable lack of engagement 
(“voice”) as shareholders, primarily exercising exit, having high ratios 
of share turnover in their portfolios, both in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries as well as in Europe.37 This is explained in part because it is 
very expensive to express voice, and second, even very large 
shareholders such as Hermes in the UK rarely have enough control 
to discipline managers.38 As a result, investor capitalism still presents 
the problem of potential managerial expropriation.  
E. Future Research 
The development of capitalism in the twenty-first century, 
particularly after the U.S. financial collapse and its subsequent 
recession, is entering a new era where there is a conflict between the 
increasing globalization of markets, finance, regulation, corporate 
activity, managers, and knowledge, and the many economic activities 
that are very much grounded at the state level. The state has played a 
much more central role in economic life in Europe and Asia until 
recently, either through regulation or through direct firm ownership 
 
 34. MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE 
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 5–8 (1997); Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance 
Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUR. 
MGMT. REV. 11, 13–21 (2008).  
 35. GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA 
(2009). 
 36. Gerald F. Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of 
Organizations, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 27, 33 (2009).  
 37. Gregory Jackson, A New Financial Capitalism? Explaining the Persistence of Exit 
over Voice in Contemporary Corporate Governance, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 23, 24–25 (2008). 
 38. Id. at 24. 
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and strategic intervention. The state’s active role in economic and 
social life, including welfare state provisions, has been for the most 
part sustained despite the strong 1990s shareholder-oriented 
pressures from the United States. These pressures resulted in an 
international hybridization process, ranging from full adoption of 
some practices, such as anti-trust regulation, to complete rejection of 
some practices such as compensation disclosure, as documented in an 
edited book by Morgan, Whitley and Moen,39 and in a book by 
Djelic40 on the “Americanization” of European firms, and in an 
article on how national culture might buffer organizational level 
innovation and institutional change,41 among many others. The 
pattern emerging now in the United States shows a more proactive 
and monitoring role in the economic governance and regulatory 
relationship between markets and firms. This is particularly so after 
the government interventions in some of the largest American 
companies that were striving to achieve maximum shareholder value 
and yet now are partially or majority state-owned, such as AIG and 
Citigroup.  
The institutional legal and economic environment has triggered 
movement from firms in emerging or developing countries looking 
to reach higher levels of legitimization in their corporate governance. 
For example, many firms from middle income, developing and 
emerging markets are listed in the New York or London Stock 
Exchange to prove to their stakeholders that they seek to meet the 
highest economic and governance standards. The movement in the 
other direction also occurs, when firms from the industrialized world 
operate in less developing or emerging markets. These firms make 
such a move, among other things, to take advantage of institutional 
arbitrage—such as weak enforcement of global environmental 
regulations, cheaper labor, or favorable government incentives. Both 
of these very common internationalization patterns expand beyond 
the ideas in the legal origins literature in showing that it is almost 
impossible to attribute economic advantages to merely one single 
legal or economic system when most firms operate multiple layers of 
legal systems and their value chain is affected differently. Today, the 
 
 39. GLENN MORGAN, RICHARD WHITLEY & ELI MOEN, CHANGING CAPITALISMS 
(2005). 
 40.  MARIE-LAURE DJELIC, EXPORTING THE AMERICAN MODEL (1998). 
 41. Trevor Buck & Azura Shahrim, The Translation of Corporate Governance Changes 
Across National Cultures: The Case of Germany, 36 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 42 (2005). 
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analogy is that firms are often born simultaneously in multiple 
countries (e.g., KPMG) or they are born global or born-again 
global, they grow in multiple countries around the world, yet they 
must die in one country (e.g., Lehman Brothers, Enron, Arthur 
Andersen).42  
A recent trend that challenges even more directly the idea that a 
certain legal system is best for economic development or that legal 
systems are ultimately constraining development is the concept of 
the “New Multinationals” as suggested by Guillén and García-
Cana.43 This concept is probably the strongest robustness test to 
refute the hypothesis that strong country-level institutions, and 
particularly the legal environment, is a necessary condition to 
economic development. The new multinational enterprises from 
emerging, upper-middle income, and rich oil countries have 
overcome the so-called liability of foreignness in the different 
markets by entering developed and developing countries 
simultaneously from the first stages of their international 
expansion.44 In this context, as suggested by Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, new multinationals tend to possess critical political capabilities 
enabling them to succeed in countries with weak institutional 
environments and compensate for their lack of resource 
endowment.45 In sum, this research in the internationalization field 
shows that MNEs’ success, such as that of Inditex of Spain (Zara) or 
Haier in China, can be achieved almost irrespective of the 
institutional environment.  
To conclude, we think that legal scholarship could benefit a great 
deal by drawing a bit more on research on national business 
systems,46 on the comparative capitalism approach,47 and more 
 
 42. See generally Jim Bell, Rod McNaughton & Stephen Young, ‘Born-Again Global’ 
Firms: An Extension to the ‘Born-Global’ Phenomenon, 7 J. INT’L MGMT. 173 (2001). 
 43. See generally Mauro Guillén & Esteban García-Canal, The American Model of the 
Multinational Firm and the “New” Multinationals from Emerging Economies, 23 ACAD. 
MGMT. PERSP. 23 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 43. 
 45. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra & Mehmet Genc, Transforming Disadvantages into 
Advantages: Developing-Country MNEs in the Least Developed Countries, 39 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 957, 963–66 (2008). 
 46. RICHARD WHITLEY, DIVERGENT CAPITALISMS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURING AND 
CHANGE OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS (1999). 
 47. MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001); 
RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM: JAPAN AND GERMANY 
VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS (2000); BOB HANCKE, MARTIN RHODES & MARK THATCHER, 
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historically oriented institutional analysis.48 We also need to think 
more systematically about how employees contribute to the value 
added to the firm, from a stakeholder perspective as suggested in the 
UK-U.S. comparison49 and from the perspective of the knowledge 
economy.50 Other authors have stressed the role of employees in the 
finance-legal relationship by studying the political power of workers51 
or the economics of human assets.52 This previous research shows 
that bringing labor into the equation helps us examine what might 
seem a remote link between employees, company resources, and 
national and global financing “machines” as Davis has shown with 
the securitization of mortgages into bonds and the takeoff of pension 
plans with the emergence of weaker and more flexible labor contracts 
in postindustrial America.53 
Firms and markets coevolve, institutions change, not only at the 
regulatory level, but also within technological and knowledge 
spheres, and these processes are shaping economic life in a reciprocal 
and evolutionary way. Economic sociology captures and illuminates 
much of this coevolution; law and finance does not.  
 
BEYOND VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: CONFLICT, CONTRADICTIONS, AND 
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY (2007); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice eds., 2001). 
 48. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 14; ARNDT SORGE, THE GLOBAL AND THE 
LOCAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DIALECTICS OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS (2005); Kathleen Thelen, 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369 (1999). 
 49.  See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON (Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton eds., 2009); Ruth V. Aguilera et al., 
Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the U.K. and the 
U.S., 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 147 (2006).  
 50.  Peer Zumbansen, The Evolution of the Corporation: Organization, Finance, 
Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility (Feb. 20, 2009) (Comparative Research in Law 
& Political Economy (CLPE), Research Paper No. 6/2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971. 
 51. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2005). 
 52. Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in 
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 
1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New 
Enterprise, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 201 
(Xavier Vives ed., 2000).  
 53. GERALD DAVIS, MANAGED BY MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA 
(2009).  
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III. WHY IS LLSV NONETHELESS IMPORTANT? 
The above sections referred to or made the following points: 
first, careful longitudinal studies and studies using more accurate 
evaluations of the components of countries’ legal systems have failed 
to support the central claim of LLSV—that a country’s legal origin is 
an important exogenous determinant of its capacity for financial 
development.54 That is to say, LLSV is based on an inaccurate view 
of the law. Second, institutional analyses and comparative political 
economy analyses of corporate governance arrangements with more 
nuanced views than those of LLSV can contribute valuable insights 
into the central question of the relationships between financial 
markets and economic development, and therefore provide a more 
considered view. That is to say, LLSV is based on an incomplete view 
of what matters for economic outcomes. Why, then, does LLSV still 
matter? 
At least in part, LLSV matters because their original 
contributions—their data-rich descriptions of ownership patterns 
around the world—have given rise to provocative research questions 
and spawned engaging academic debates and comparative analyses.55 
They have established and defined the field of law and finance, and 
then elaborated upon it with prodigious productivity. Few academics 
can point to similar accomplishments. They are, quite simply, 
academic rock stars.  
Yet, as a number of contributors to this special issue discuss,56 
LLSV matters for at least two additional reasons that go beyond 
academics: first, because their ideas have been adopted in 
international development initiatives by the World Bank as the basis 
for one set of its policy prescriptions for economic development in 
emerging markets; and second, because their ideas are indicative of, 
and have supported, the virtually unrelenting pressure on European 
countries to adopt more market-dominated systems for organizing 
their economic life.  
While one could think that perhaps LLSV’s ideas have simply 
been misused in these regards, their own ten-year retrospective of 
 
 54.  John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica & Mathias Siems, Law and Financial 
Development: What We Are Learning from Time-Series Evidence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1435. 
 55. See La Porta et al., supra note 2; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2. 
 56. See Armour et. al., supra note 54; John Ohnesorge, Legal Origins and the Tasks of 
Corporate Law in Economic Development: A Preliminary Exploration, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1619. 
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their work, published in 2008, ends with a clear policy preference: 
“[O]ur framework suggests that the common law approach to social 
control of economic life performs better than the civil law approach. 
When markets do or can work well, it is better to support than to 
replace them.”57 It is because LLSV’s preference for market solutions 
has had such powerful reverberations in global policy developments 
and European debate that it is important to examine their analysis in 
more depth. 
A. LLSV and the World Bank’s Doing Business Initiative 
LLSV’s work is consistent with and has provided intellectual 
support for a complex of policy prescriptions that are considered 
important in allowing financial markets to flourish—introducing 
clear property rights to facilitate exchange; protecting principles of 
freedom of contract; and perhaps most central in their writing, 
enhancing the legal protections for outside investors and outside 
senior creditors. As described by leading law-and-development 
scholar David Trubek, reform initiatives implementing these kinds of 
broad policy goals have been incorporated into the World Bank’s 
rule of law initiatives over the last two decades.58 These programs 
derive from the Washington Consensus: the view that promoting 
economic development through export-led growth, attracting 
foreign investment and encouraging capital market development and 
integration is the most effective way to alleviate poverty.59 Between 
1990 and 2005, the World Bank has therefore supported 330 “rule 
of law” initiatives at a cost of $2.9 billion.60 As Professor Trubek also 
discussed, as the consensus over the Washington Consensus has 
started to dissolve, the World Bank has begun to develop a broader 
range of policy approaches to poverty alleviation that provides more 
 
 57.  See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 327. Replacing markets, in LLSV terms, 
includes civil law countries’ continuing “to resort to ‘policy-implementing’ solutions to newly 
arising problems,” such as “using state mandates to solve social problems, such as the thirty-
five hour work-week in France,” rather than adopting “market-supporting” solutions. Id. 
 58. See David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, 
and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
 59.  See generally John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 15 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 7 (2009). 
 60. Trubek, supra note 58, at 74.  
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latitude to more directly address social and economic development 
efforts of a ‘bottom up” nature.61  
Based in significant part on LLSV’s methodology for quantifying 
law, one strand of rule of law projects that is still emerging is the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Initiative, begun in 2004.62 That 
initiative is an ambitious attempt to collect information on the ease 
of doing business in (now) 183 countries in order to quantify and 
benchmark “the scope and manner of regulations that enhance 
business activity and those that constrain it.”63 In 2004, five types of 
business activities were evaluated in 133 countries: (1) starting a 
business; (2) hiring and firing workers (the “Employing Workers’ 
Index,” which became particularly controversial); (3) enforcing a 
contract; (4) getting credit; and (5) closing a business.64 In 2005, 
two more measures were added for (6) registering property; and  
(7) protecting investors.65 In 2007, additional measures evaluating 
(8) business taxes; (9) trading across borders; and (10) dealing with 
licenses were added.66 From these submeasures the World Bank 
produces an ordinal ranking of countries on the ease of doing 
business, a ranking that suggests in 2010 the rather counterintuitive 
view that it is better to do business in Thailand, Georgia, Saudi 
Arabia, Malaysia, or Estonia versus Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria, France, or Spain.67  
Initial exposition by the World Bank of the premises of the 
project show the close intellectual affinity to LLSV’s work, as the 
Bank concluded in 2004 that “[h]eavier regulation of business 
activities generally brings bad outcomes, while clearly defined and 
well-protected property rights enhance prosperity.”68 Lest one misses 
the point, the Bank also emphasized that “[c]ommon law countries 
regulate the least. Countries in the French civil law tradition the 
most.”69 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See generally Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The 
Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007). 
 63. Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 64. Id. at 1097. 
 65. Id. at 1098. 
 66. Id.  
 67. World Bank Report, Doing Business 2010, available at http://www.doingbusiness. 
org/economyrankings/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). 
 68. Davis & Kruse, supra note 62, at 1102 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In a thoughtful evaluation of the Doing Business Initiative, Davis 
and Kruse praise the project for its attempt to systematically evaluate 
business environments. However, they also express concerns over the 
methodology, given that “law is inherently difficult to measure in 
quantitative terms,”70 and given the lack of empirical evidence (other 
than from LLSV and acolytes we would suggest) that the parameters 
they have chosen to evaluate have a clear relationship with important 
social and economic outcomes in developing economies.71 
Moreover, some of the elements being evaluated are ideologically 
charged, such as those giving higher scores to countries in which it is 
easy to hire and fire workers and in which business taxes are low.72 
Seeing how the World Bank describes changes its methodology in 
2009 for “scoring” labor gives a good indication of the perspective: 
The methodology for one of the Doing Business topics—
employing workers—was updated this year. . . . The scope of the 
question on night and weekly holiday work has been limited to 
manufacturing activities in which continuous operation is 
economically necessary. Legally mandated wage premiums for night 
and weekly holiday work up to a threshold are no longer 
considered a restriction. In addition, the calculation of the 
minimum wage ratio was modified to ensure that an economy 
would not benefit in the scoring from lowering the minimum wage 
to below $1.25 a day, adjusted for purchasing power parity. This 
level is consistent with recent adjustments to the absolute poverty 
line. Finally, the calculation of the redundancy cost was adjusted so 
that having severance payments or unemployment protections 
below a certain threshold does not mean a better score for an 
economy.73  
Clearly there are political forces at work much beyond LLSV’s 
analysis to make these kinds of assumptions palatable to some people 
(but by no means all people) working in an institution like the World 
Bank, whose primary goal is to eradicate poverty. It is surprising that 
a development agency’s metric would reward pay levels below the 
absolute poverty line or would reward lowering social protections for 
workers who are fired or unemployed. Prior to the changes in 
 
 70. Id. at 1104.  
 71. Id. at 1109–12. 
 72. Id. at 1112–14. 
 73. THE WORLD BANK, IFC, & PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, DOING BUSINESS 2010: 
REFORMING THROUGH DIFFICULT TIMES 78 (2009). 
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methodology in 2009, that was precisely the direction that countries’ 
reform efforts could take in order to increase their score in the 
Doing Business Initiative, and to increase their likelihood of 
attracting funding from the World Bank or the U.S. Millenium 
Challenge Accounts.74 Further research should evaluate the extent to 
which other, more direct World Bank development initiatives with 
proven potential to reduce poverty, such as educating girls in rural 
societies, were sacrificed on behalf of the Doing Business Initiative. 
To the extent that LLSV’s work informs both the methodology 
and assumptions of the Doing Business project—and their own 
retrospective discusses their involvement and the reforms the project 
has encouraged—concerns regarding the reliability of LLSV’s 
methodology and results (as discussed above and by Deakin and 
other scholars)75 are heightened. Some of the legal reforms that the 
Doing Business Initiative promotes presumably have positive 
consequences for enhancing social welfare outcomes, such as reforms 
that shrink the size of the unofficial economy or permit extremely 
low-income people to advance ownership claims over property. By 
failing to untangle those reforms that improve the lives of the poor 
from those that simply mesh with the political commitments of 
economists such as LLSV, though, the World Bank risks 
undermining both its reputation and its efficacy in achieving its core 
mission. 
B. LLSV and the Promotion of Shareholder Corporate Governance 
It is beyond the remit of this short Essay to demonstrate the 
various ways in which European countries and companies have been 
under constant pressure over the last three decades to adopt so-
called Anglo-Saxon concepts of corporate governance and finance; 
that is, until August 2007 when the global financial fabric began to 
unravel. When the intellectual history of this era is written, these 
authors have no doubt that it will show that a “west wind was 
blowing” as cadres of professors, asset managers, shareholder 
activists, and institutional investors from the United States enjoyed 
European hospitality on a quite regular basis (every summer for 
many professors), even as they encouraged European leaders, 
countries, and companies to adopt American values, specifically 
 
 74. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 62, at 1116.  
 75. Armour et al., supra note 54.  
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American “shareholder value,” rather than stakeholder value, as the 
touchstone of proper corporate governance. At a macro level, a 
deeply held belief in the superiority of market mechanisms rather 
than government involvement for solving important social 
coordination problems underlies much of this promotional activity, 
influenced by three decades of deregulatory political and economic 
theory.76  
LLSV’s thesis shares this faith in markets, and their work 
supports legal rules, such as those protecting minority shareholders, 
to encourage financial markets to flourish. As they summarize: 
In sum, there is by now a great deal of evidence that legal origins 
influence legal rules and regulations, which in turn have substantial 
impact on important economic outcomes—from financial 
development, to unemployment, to investment and entry, to the 
size of the unofficial economy, to international trade. Much of this 
evidence suggests that common law is associated with better 
economic outcomes than French civil law.77 
Even so, they point out that “it is less clear that legal origins 
predict aggregate growth.”78 The authors expound:  
[The finding that it is uncertain whether legal origins predict 
aggregate growth] resonates with the obvious observation made by 
LLSV (1998) that countries like France and Belgium achieved high 
living standards despite their legal origin. One possible explanation 
of the aggregate growth evidence is that civil law countries have 
found compensating mechanisms to overcome the baggage of their 
legal tradition in the long run.79  
Indeed, as the authors stated in a footnote, “We note, however, that 
the evidence on the relationship between [legal origin] institutions 
and aggregate growth more generally, which seemed substantial a 
few years ago, has been crumbling.”80  
This last admission is the point at which one wonders if the 
asserted superiority of the common law system for “better economic 
outcomes” is also crumbling. If the financial development that is 
 
 76.  Frank Jan De Graaf & Cynthia A. Williams, The Intellectual Foundations of the 
Global Financial Crisis, 32:2 U. NEW S. WALES L. REV. 390, 402–05 (2009). 
 77. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 302. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 302 n.11 (citation omitted).  
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encouraged by common law legal origins is not leading to higher 
aggregate economic growth, then on what basis is financial 
development a useful measure of better economic outcomes? And on 
what basis is a high level of financial development per se a good thing 
and demonstrative of institutional superiority if it does not lead to 
higher aggregate growth in the real economy? These are questions 
policy makers are posing today in light of the global financial crisis. 
An example is found in the Turner Review for the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) in the UK, where Lord Turner observed that in the 
UK and the U.S., from the 1980s on, “[t]he evolution of the 
securitised credit model was accompanied by a remarkable growth in 
the relative size of wholesale financial services within the overall 
economy, with activities internal to the banking system growing far 
more rapidly than end services to the real economy.”81  
It seems likely that the measure of financial development LLSV 
use as their indicator of better outcomes from common law legal 
origins, stock market capitalization per GDP,82 is simply a measure of 
the degree of financialization of a particular economy. This view is 
consistent with the data LLSV present at Table 7 of their ten-year 
retrospective reprinted in part below. This table shows that most 
countries experienced an increase in stock market capitalization per 
GDP between 1990 and 1999, 83 a time when the technology bubble 
in stock prices was developing in many advanced economies, pushing 
stock market values higher generally. Table 7 also shows that in a 
number of countries, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
grew dramatically higher from 1990 to 1999, most notably in the 
United Kingdom (from 0.81 to 2.25) (English legal origin); the 
United States (0.54 to 1.52) (English legal origin); the Netherlands 
(0.50 to 2.03) (French legal origin); Switzerland (1.93 to 3.23) 
(German legal origin); and Sweden (0.39 to 1.77) (Scandinavian 




 81. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 16 (2009).  
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 83. Id. at 317.  
 84. Id. 
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Country  Legal Origin  1990  1999 
Australia  English 0.37 1.13
Canada  English 1.22 1.22
India  English 0.16 0.46
South Africa English 1.33 1.20
United Kingdom English 0.81 2.25
United States English 0.54 1.52
Avg Common Law  0.74  1.30 
Argentina  French 0.15
Belgium  French 0.31 0.82
Brazil  French 0.08 0.45
Chile  French 0.50 1.05
Cuba  French
Egypt, Arab Rep. French 0.06 0.29
France  French 0.24 1.17
Italy  French 0.13 0.68
Netherlands French 0.50 2.03
Russian Federation French 0.11
Spain  French 0.41 0.69
Avg French Law  0.28  0.74 
Austria  German 0.17 0.17
Germany  German 0.20 0.67
Japan  German 1.64 0.95
Switzerland German 1.93 3.23
Avg German Law    0.99  1.26 
Denmark  Scandinavian 0.67 0.67
Norway  Scandinavian 0.23 0.70
Sweden  Scandinavian 0.39 1.77
Avg Scandinavian Law  0.43  1.05 
 
If, as it seems, the legal origins measure of stock market 
capitalization to GDP does not relate to or predict aggregate growth 
but perhaps does measure financialization, then this outcome 
measure may, in more market economies, be inversely related to better 
economic outcomes. While this is frank speculation, it is based on 
the view that the underlying strengths and stabilities of European 
social democracies perhaps ameliorated the worst excesses and 
instabilities of financialization even where financialization was well 
 
 85. Id. at 317 tbl.7 (data from previous years omitted). 
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advanced (such as in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden, 
above). 
With our argument that financialization per se is not a useful 
measure of “better economic outcomes,” and with debate amongst 
economists concerning the value to countries’ economies of foreign 
direct investment in predicting better economic outcomes for 
developing economies,86 LLSV need to concentrate on higher 
unemployment levels and a larger informal economy in civil law 
countries to make the case that “common law is associated with 
better economic outcomes.”87 Unemployment levels and the extent 
of informal economies are undoubtedly important measures of real 
economic benefits or detriments from systems of laws, regulations, 
and norms, and so it is here that LLSV’s analysis is most persuasive. 
Yet, LLSV seem to be engaging in academic cherry picking. A more 
comprehensive look at other measures of the economic benefits of 
the European (civil law) systems of social and economic organization 
suggests as much. 
In his recent book, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded 
Planet, economist Jeffrey Sachs compares data on various measures 
of economic health between the social-welfare states of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden; the mixed economies of Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands (which has 
aspects of both social welfare and mixed economy); and the more 
free-market countries of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.88 Professor Sachs 
presents data showing lower poverty rates in the social-welfare states 
(5.6%) compared to the mixed economies (9%), compared to the 
free-market states (12.6%), with the United States showing a poverty 
rate of 17.1%.89 (The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of 
people living at less than half the average national household 
income).90 The Gini coefficient, which measures the equality of 
 
 86.  See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital-Market Liberalization, Globalization, and the 
IMF, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 57, 64–65 (2004). LLSV use higher levels of foreign 
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 87. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 302. 
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 89. Id. at 261. 
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wealth distribution within countries, where 0 is perfectly equal and 
100 is perfectly unequal was 24.7 for social-welfare states; 28 for the 
mixed economies; and 32 for the free-market economies, with the 
United States at 35.7.91 Average per capita income is higher in the 
social-welfare states as compared to the free-market economies, with 
the mixed economies placing third.92 And, contrary to LLSV’s 
conclusions, Professor Sachs presents data showing that “the social-
welfare states have an even higher employment rate (number of 
workers as a share of the working-age population) than the free-
market countries.”93 He concludes that “the social-welfare states 
have achieved high levels of incomes, low rates of poverty, and a 
more equal distribution of incomes than the free-market societies.”94 
These conclusions provide a sharp contrast to LLSV’s incomplete 
picture of the economic outcomes asserted to flow from legal 
origins, and suggest that the debates over the superiority of different 
capitalist systems of economic organization should not be considered 
over.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
LLSV’s research purporting to demonstrate the importance of 
the legal origins of a country for its stock market development and 
ownership dispersion, mediated through the protection of minority 
shareholders as against directors, has been subjected to enough 
further, careful analysis that we can see both the inaccuracies and the 
importance of their research.  
In this Essay, we have suggested that economic sociology has 
much to add to the raw facts of ownership patterns within countries. 
There are provocative hints that companies with controlling 
shareholders can actually outperform companies without, contingent 
on the nature of the owners (family, state, bank, parent company, 
etc.), the type of industrial sector, the stage of the firm’s life cycle, 
and the other institutional arrangements in the country. Putting 
ownership patterns on the agenda of academic inquiry was clearly an 
important contribution by LLSV. Understanding what those 
patterns imply about firm performance, within different institutional 
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arrangements and complementarities, is yet to be fully addressed, 
either in their work or in comparative corporate governance 
generally. 
We have also suggested that it is important to understand the 
contributions, if any, of legal origins to positive economic measures of 
a country’s health, fully conceived. Financial measures alone do not 
suffice to provide that understanding, as we have argued above. In 
light of the collapse of innovative financialization over the past year, 
and the resulting global recession, we should re-examine LLSV’s 
fundamental conceptions—and perhaps misconceptions—of the 
value of stock market capitalization per se as a measure of healthy 
economics.  
In short, we have not reached the “end of history” for law and 
finance. 
 
 
